The following article is reproduced from People in Aid’s Emergency Capacity Building Project “Case Study of Good Practice”
1. Introduction
The continuing conflict in Afghanistan is described as the British Government’s most important foreign priority. Ten years since war first broke out, and with 2014 looming as the anticipated date for transition to full Afghan control, the challenges faced by policy makers, diplomats and advisers on the ground have never been greater.
In early 2010, Hamish Wilson, Consultant and Director of Wasafiri Consulting, was engaged by the UK’s Stabilisation Unit – a specialised agency jointly owned by the Ministry of Defence, Foreign Office and Department for International Development – and deployed to Helmand’s remote northern districts as a Stabilisation Adviser, working on behalf of the Provincial Reconstruction Team.
The war-torn districts of Musa Qala and Now Zad had become infamous as ‘the heart of darkness’ throughout the years of drug lord and Taliban rule. The Afghan Government and NATO wrested back control and with the support of advisers such as Hamish, are helping restore normality for the local population
Embedded with US Marines, and responsible for managing a team of international and Afghan civilians (known as a District Stabilisation Team or DST), Hamish was specifically tasked with coordinating efforts to establish a functional district government and to oversee all reconstruction and development activities.
2. Experiences and reality on the ground
“We as civilians play an unlikely intermediary role – we sit firmly between the US Military and the Afghan political and community leadership. This is the space in which we operate to find ways to generate concerted action to drive the recovery efforts forward coherently.” says Hamish.
He goes on to describe the context in more detail; “Insecurity is high, our movements are limited, people shift their allegiances without warning, and the events of the moment can be utterly unpredictable. Out here the consequences for poor judgement can be extremely high…
Hamish describes an average day in the Musa Qala ‘Forward Operating Base’, painting a vivid (and exhausting) picture of weighty issues and relentless demands for attention: dealing with the aftermath of an attack on the local market, working with the Governor to improve taxation, meeting with the Director of Education to re-open a school closed by fighting, drafting the Governance and Rule of Law aspects of the campaign plan, hosting a team of journalists from Kabul and planning for the coming Community Council elections.
His tales evoke a sense of the leadership dilemmas that must be confronted daily; Where do you draw the line with corruption? How do we best allocate our limited funds? How do we support Afghans to take the lead? How do we manage the incessant competing demands? How do we re-establish a ‘humanitarian space’? How do we address human rights abuses? The list clearly goes on…
Hamish describes some of the keys to success: “Successful leadership in this context is one founded on how well you manage an extraordinarily complex set of relationships between a wildly colourful range of people and institutions – many with competing pressures and interests… If I am respected by the US Marine commander, if I am trusted by the District Governor, if I am valued by the village elders, listened to by the Police Chief, or the farmer who sympathises with the Taliban… then we have a chance of moving forward together. Its fragile and painstaking…”
3. Lessons for the future
As the Afghan and international communities cast their gaze toward the threshold year of 2014, they must begin to lay the foundations for what will emerge as effective leadership in a post-transition world.
Two crucial issues will threaten the prospects of stability over that time if they are overlooked – the strength of Afghan institutions such as it’s security forces and government administration, and the effectiveness of their leaders. In effect, the ‘battle for transition’ will be determined by the efforts of international advisers such as Hamish to build the capacity of local leadership in hostile regions such as Musa Qala. Hamish summarises his efforts thus far;
“This isn’t Iraq. We are working in areas without basic infrastructure, or established education systems, suffering poor access and communication links, and where the concept of government is foreign.” His work with local leaders is focussed on:
- Helping them create effective means of public engagement and participation
- Supporting their efforts to resolve complex and competing issues
- Developing basic systems of accountability and management of public finances
- Helping them to better manage their own teams and people
- Coaching them on navigating Afghan and international institutions
But the race is on. In just a few short years, it will be the Afghans taking the lead for themselves, with or without such support.
4. Conclusion
Hamish makes it clear that there are simply not enough resources to adequately accelerate the daunting task of developing local leadership in time for the deadline of transition. “There are only six in my team, yet we are working with the Police, Prosecutor, Governor’s team, Line Ministry officials, local leaders, Council members… there is a real risk that it is too little too late…”
And he is right – the sacrifices of the past decade, and the intensive efforts of the next few years will only create the conditions for a durable political settlement, for a lasting peace, if Afghan leadership succeeds. That then, must become the rallying cry for the international community.
